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1. Noah Feldman, The Democratic Fatwa: Islam and Democracy in the Realm of
Constitutional Politics, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2005).
2. Id. at 6.
3. Id. at 1.
4. Id. at 2.
5. Id. 
6. See id. at 5-6.
7. Id. at 5.
8. Id. at 6.
9. Id. at 8.
10. Certainly the prospect of a vanquishing force installing (and ultimately controlling)
the leadership of the vanquished country is new neither to history nor to the United States.
11
ESCAPING VICTORS JUSTICE BY THE USE OF
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONS
RANDALL T. COYNE*
Professor Feldman engagingly describes how, during the American
occupation of Iraq, Ayatollah Ali Sistani  an Iranian-born,1 unelected cleric,2
virtually unknown outside the Shii cleric community3  emerged from relative
obscurity to assume the most significant individual role in Iraqi politics during
the period of occupation.4  Putting aside the mouse-that-roared quality of
Sistanis political ascendance, his story is particularly poignant when one
considers that this respected cleric was known mostly for his view that mullahs
should not intervene in politics.5
Sistanis story, artfully recounted by Professor Feldman, need not be
repeated here, except to emphasize the fact that his June 26, 2003 fatwa6
effectively derailed the Coalition Provisional Authoritys (CPA) plan to
democratize Iraq by means of a national constitution drafted by selected  not
elected  framers.7  The central point of Sistanis fatwa is that if Iraq is to
become a legitimate democracy, governed by a constitution that reflects the
religious beliefs and social values of the Iraqi people, then a body
democratically elected by Iraqis must write the Iraqi constitution.8
Was the unremarkable principle somehow lost on the CPA that the roots of
an incipient democracy not destined to wither and rot must themselves be
democratic?  Or, as Professor Feldman darkly hints,9 did the CPA favor the
decidedly undemocratic selection, rather than election, of Iraqs constitution-
drafting assembly to enable the United States to continue to wield
disproportionate control over the Iraqi leadership?10
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11. As this essay was being written, news accounts suggested that the United States may
be preparing to export democracy to Iran.  Specifically, investigative reporter Seymour Hersh
revealed that the United States has Special Forces troops on the ground in Iran, searching for
locations worth bombing.  Seymour M. Hersh, The Coming Wars:  What the Pentagon Can
Now Do in Secret, NEW YORKER, Jan. 24 & 31, 2005, available at http://www.newyorker.com/
fact/content/?050124fa_fact.  In a cryptic news release that amounts to little more than a
nondenial denial, the Pentagon reacted strongly to Hershs story, complaining that "Hersh's
article is so riddled with errors of fundamental fact that the credibility of his entire piece is
destroyed."  Statement from Pentagon Spokesman Lawrence DiRita on Latest Seymour Hersh
Article, Jan. 17, 2005, at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2005/nr20050117-1987.html.
12. According to Professor Feldman, Sistani, the apolitical religious scholar, became
widely known as the most prominent spokesman for electoral democracy in Iraq.  Feldman,
supra note 1, at 2.
13. Id. at 7.
14. My description of Husseins depravities owes much to the excellent essay of Michael
J. Frank, Justice for Iraq, Justice for All, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 303 (2004).
15. Id. at 308.
16. Past Repression and Atrocities by Saddam Husseins Regime, U.S. STATE DEPT FACT
SHEET, Apr. 4, 2003, at http://www.state.gov/s/wci/fs/19352.htm [hereinafter FACT SHEET].
17. Id.  Human rights groups claim that Saddam and his agents ordered the murder of as
many as 300,000 Iraqis.  Margaret Neighbour, Revealed: Man in Charge of Trying Saddam,
That the United States  the great liberator of Iraq and the putative world
exporter of democracy11  should be schooled in basic democratic theory by
Sistani,12 a Shii jurisprude whose traditional practices and public
pronouncements consistently eschewed the political involvement of religious
leaders, is deliciously ironic  and not just a little embarrassing.13  Thankfully,
as Iraq takes its first halting steps as a fledgling democracy and struggles to
define the precise contours of that democracy, guidance and inspiration can be
found in the experience of countries other than the United States.
Seeking Justice in Postwar Iraqs Neodemocracy
One of the key attributes of postoccupation democracy in Iraq will be the
means by which that sovereign nation addresses the atrocities perpetrated by
Saddam Hussein and his Baath party accomplices.14  According to a U.S. Army
judge advocate formerly assigned to the special prosecutions section of the
Multi-National Force-Iraq, these atrocities include: oppression of the Shiites,
genocide against the Kurds, torture and systematic rape of the citizenry, testing
biological weapons on prisoners of war, unprovoked invasion of Kuwait, and
looting the Iraqi treasury for personal gain.15  A U.S. Department of State fact
sheet sketches the staggering scale of suffering that Saddam subjected the Iraqi
people to during the twenty-odd years of his repressive regime.16  Attributing
many hundreds of thousands of deaths to Saddams actions,17 the State
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol58/iss1/2
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SCOTSMAN, Apr. 21, 2004, available at http://news.scotsman.com/print.cfm?id=448402004&
referringtemplate=http%3A%2F%2F; see also Dan Eggen, Building a Case Against Hussein,
PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 8, 2004, at A6. 






24. Those favoring summary execution may be mindful of the frequent summary
executions carried out under Saddams regime: 4,000 prisoners at [the] Abu Ghraib prison
in 1984; 3,000 prisoners at the Mahjar prison from 1993-1998; [and] 2,500 prisoners . . .
between 1997-1999 [as part of a] prison cleansing campaign.  Id.
25. Frank, supra note 14, at 308 n.28; Erika Niedowski, Iraqi Doctors Acknowledged
Rights Abuses: Forced to Sever Ears, Remove Patients Organs, BALT. SUN, Mar. 24, 2004,
at A1.  Judge Advocate Frank acknowledges, as he must, that the punishment of ear removal
is not unknown outside of the Middle East.  Frank, supra note 14, at 308 n.28.  In sixteenth
century England, larceny was punished by lopping off the perpetrators ears.  Id.  Indeed, in
colonial America, authorities imposed a number of corporal punishments that would be
considered tantamount to torture by modern standards of decency.  RANDALL COYNE & LYN
Department fact sheet lists the myriad iniquities and devastating consequences
ordered by Saddam and carried out by his Baathist henchmen.  A representative
sample follows:
 Between 1987 and 1988, the Iraqi regime conducted a genocidal campaign
of terror against the Kurds, destroying 2000 Kurdish villages, forty of which
were attacked with mustard gas and nerve agents.18  The largest chemical attack
killed approximately 5000 people at Halabja.19  Between 50,000 and 100,000
Kurds are believed to have perished.20
 In 1984 alone, 4,000 prisoners were executed at the Abu Ghraib prison.21
 Between 1999 and 2003, 400,000 Iraqi children under the age of five died
of malnutrition, which may be linked to the fact that Saddam hoarded food and
medicine provided by the international community in military warehouses and
did not distribute it.22
 Oppressive government policies internally displaced nearly one million
Iraqis, and more than 200,000 Iraqis fled to Iran for refuge.23
Perhaps even more chilling than the facts above are the graphic descriptions
of countless tortures and mutilations.  To be fair to those who argue that
death  either summary execution24 or execution following some sort of
judicial proceeding  is the only just and appropriate outcome for Saddam and
his band of sadists, a few examples follow:
 Army deserters were punished by having their ears removed by Iraqi
doctors.25
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ENTZEROTH, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 5-6 (2d ed. 2001).
26.  Frank, supra note 14, at 318 n.79.
27.  Id. at 319 n.84; Jonathan Gurwitz, Not Even a Glance at Saddams Crimes, SAN
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, June 27, 2004, at 3H.
28. Frank, supra note 14, at 319, n.85; John Powers, Mass Graves Testify to Saddams
Evil, INSIGHT MAG., Mar. 16, 2004, at 39.
29. Feldman, supra note 1, at 9.
30. Shock and Awe is the descriptive nickname given to the American bombing assault
on Baghdad.  Also known as rapid dominance, shock and awe is a military tactic that
deter[s] and overpower[s] an adversary through the adversarys perception and fear of his
vulnerability and [his attackers] invulnerability.  Ira Chernus, Shock & Awe: Is Baghdad the
Next Hiroshima?, at http://www.commondreams.org/views03/0127-08.htm (last visited  Feb.
17, 2005).  The notion is initially to strike with such potentially devastating force that the
enemy has no option other than surrendering or risking complete obliteration.  Id.
31. Proposals include prosecution before military tribunals, U.N. sanctioned courts,
special international tribunals, and the International Criminal Court.  See Frank, supra note
14, at 303-04.
 In 1985, seven Iraqi businessmen charged with currency manipulation had
their arms surgically lopped off in a procedure videotaped by Saddams secret
police.26
 Other videotapes depict savage scenes of decapitation, fingers chopped off
one by one, tongues hacked out with a razor blade all while victims shriek in
pain and the thugs chant Saddams praises.27
Quite possibly the most disturbing account recites that
Saddams methods included using hammers to break bones, ripping
out fingernails, amputating limbs with a chain saw, crucifixion,
throwing live victims in acid baths and ovens, cutting loose wild
dogs to attack victims, raping women in the presence of their
children and husbands, cutting off a penis or a breast, and stripping
children naked and forcing their parents to watch as they were stung
by hornets and scorpions.28
A Modest Proposal
This response does not purport to provide an answer to Professor Feldmans
rhetorical inquiry, What sort of government and institutions will emerge [in
Iraqs neodemocracy]?29  Instead, the remainder of this essay is devoted to the
proposition that the government ultimately rising from the ashes of Operation
Shock and Awe30 should reject the proposed retributive criminal prosecution
alternatives31 and, at least initially, follow examples set by South Africa and
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol58/iss1/2
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32. Hardly an innovation, for more than two decades, TRCs have been commissioned to
research and report on human rights abuses in Europe, Central America, South America, and
Africa.  See Truth Commission Digital Collection, JEANETTE RANKIN LIBRARY PROGRAM, at
http://www.usip.org/library/truth.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2005) [hereinafter Truth
Commission].  Although the composition, establishment, mandate, and duration of TRCs vary
from country to country, in general TRCs are charged with compiling accurate histories of past
abuses of authority, promoting national reconciliation, and lending legitimacy to newly
constituted governments and policies.  Id.
33. Neighbour, supra note 17.
34. Id. (reporting that Saddam and his codefendants will be tried before seven judges and
prosecuted by four prosecutors who will be assisted by a team of fifty lawyers, investigators,
and support staff provided by the U.S. Department of Justice).
35.  War Crimes Tribunals, An In-Depth Analysis from Issues and Controversies on
File   The Nazis and Nuremberg, at http://www.facts.com/icof/nazi.htm (last visited Feb. 17,
2005).
other countries by embracing a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)
restorative approach to justice.32
Truth and Reconciliation Generally
If Iraq is to move out from the darkness of political violence and repression
that defined Saddams reign and into the promising light of democracy, it must
choose among three possible courses of action.  First, Iraq can attempt to ignore
its recent violent history, permitting those guilty of atrocities to remain
unpunished and perhaps even prosper under the new government.  Conceivably
this is the least desirable option because it denies justice and compensation to
victims families and leaves wide open the door to renewed violence and
personal retribution.  Also, this approach defies human nature because its
success seems to depend upon the collective ability of those aggrieved to both
forgive and forget.
Second, Iraq can establish  and appears at least initially to have committed
to  a formal judicial framework for prosecuting Saddam and his associates.33
Presumably, Iraq will not set up war crime tribunals modeled after the
International Military Tribunal assembled in Nuremberg following World War
II, preferring instead to proceed with an internal Iraqi Special Tribunal.34  If
Iraq hopes to bring to justice as many culpable offenders as possible, an Iraqi-
led special court makes more sense than a Nuremberg-type tribunal, which was
designed to prosecute only high-level Nazi officials.35  Nonetheless, even the
Iraqi Special Tribunal  and any other courts constituted for this purpose 
may fail to accomplish enough to slake that countrys thirst for justice.  One
need only recall that, apart from the high-profile Nuremberg defendants, some
5000 other Nazis, including concentration camp guards and soldiers, were
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2005




39. Alastair Endersby, Topic: Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, at http://www.




43. [NTA: Please cite if possible.]
44. As Richard Starkey once observed, Youve got to pay your dues if you want to sing
the blues, and you know it dont come easy.  Richard Starkey, It Dont Come Easy, on RINGO
(Capitol Records 1991).
charged with war crimes.36  Most of these defendants, however, escaped
prosecution (let alone conviction) by fleeing to other countries and assuming
new identities.37  Indeed, from 1946-1949, American military courts managed
to conduct a meager twelve trials, involving 182 defendants and resulting in
only eighty-nine convictions.38
A third, and perhaps superior, option would be for Iraq to set up a TRC.39
TRCs provide a unique way for countries making the transition from despotism
to democracy to address human rights abuses and politically motivated crimes.40
By providing an official forum for victims, relatives, and perpetrators to give
evidence of human rights abuses and political crimes,41 TRCs enable countries
to formally acknowledge their tragic histories and begin the healing process.  An
Iraqi TRC would require the entire country to acknowledge its past, to
document and confront the widespread violence perpetrated by Saddam and
other factions, to recognize the myriad ways in which countless Iraqis were
victimized, and to seek reconciliation through forgiveness.42  Although TRCs
vary considerably in their mandates, this essay proposes that Iraq seek
restorative justice achieved through granting conditional amnesty to violators
in exchange for their complete and candid admissions, the same approach
adopted by the post-apartheid South African government.43
There should be no illusion that adapting a TRC model to fit a Middle
Eastern country such as Iraq will be an effortless enterprise.44  No Middle
Eastern nation has yet embraced a TRC.  Even in Western societies that
embrace principles of Christianity, notions of forgiveness and amnesty
sometimes choke in the throats of those who purport to administer secular
justice.  For a TRC to become a viable strategy, Iraqs democratic leadership
must not only possess the courage to pursue a fresh approach to seeking justice,
but must also entertain the conviction that a TRC can achieve justice on a scale
not attainable through traditional prosecution models.  An examination of South
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol58/iss1/2
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45. Verane Castelnau, Fortsetzung: South Africas Truth and Reconciliation Commission;
How to Build the Roads of Reconciliation?, Mar. 23, 2004, at http://www.weltpolitik.net/
Regionen/Afrika/S%FCdafrika/Analysen/Fortsetzung1%3A%20South%20Africa%92s%20
Truth%20and%20Reconciliation%20Commission.html [hereinafter Castelnau, Building
Roads].
46. Id.
47. Apartheid refers to the policy of South Africas whites-only government to keep the
races strictly separated.  Since 1973, the United Nations has classified apartheid as a crime
against humanity. [NTA: Please cite.]
48. Castelnau, Building Roads, supra note 45.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Verane Castelnau, Fortsetzung: South Africas Truth and Reconciliation Commission;
Does Telling the Truth Lead to Reconciliation?, Mar. 23, 2004, at http://www.weltpolitik.net/
Regionen/Afrika/S%FCdafrika/Analysen/Fortsetzung2%3A%20South%20Africa%92s%20
Truth%20and% 20Reconciliation%20Commission.html [hereinafter Castelnau, Telling the
Truth].
Africas TRC provides reason to be encouraged and optimistic about the
prospects for an Iraqi TRC.
South Africas Experience with a Truth and Reconciliation Commission
In 1991, twenty-six representatives from various South African political
parties, religious groups, and business entities signed a National Peace Accord,
signaling a commitment to the eradication of political violence, the
establishment of a pluralistic democracy, and the reconstruction and
development of the country.45  Three years later, the National Unity government
was convinced that meaningful, permanent progress was possible only if South
Africans were willing and able to turn away from resentment and embrace a
process of reconciliation.46  The National Unity government adopted a
temporary constitution, eliminated the Apartheid laws,47 and agreed to a Human
Rights charter.48
In 1995, the government passed the Promotion of National Unity and
Reconciliation Act, which established the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (SATRC).49  From 1995 to 1998, the SATRC
operated as a temporary, nonjudicial mechanism with power to investigate,
document, and redress human rights violations.50 To that end, the SATRC
collected the testimonies of 22,000 victims who recounted 38,000 serious
violations, including 10,000 murders.51
The most important, and certainly the most controversial, of the SATRCs
powers was the authority to grant amnesty to criminals in exchange for full
disclosure.  The contours of this provisional amnesty bear examination:
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2005
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52. Castelnau, Building Roads, supra note 45 (emphasis added) (internal quotations
omitted).
53. Castelnau, Telling the Truth, supra note 51.
54. Id.
55. TRCs are often charged with preparing final reports at the conclusion of their
Amnesty shall be granted in respect of acts, omissions and
offences associated with political objectives and committed in the
course of the conflicts of the past. . . .  All common law crimes not
related to political motives were not included.  A person seeking
amnesty had to apply to the Amnesty Committee.  The applicant
must prove that an act for which amnesty was sought had been
committed during the period within the mandate of the Commission
and had been politically motivated or committed in order to carry
out the objectives of a particular political organisation or institution.
The crime must be proportionate to the political motive and more
importantly, the applicant must make full disclosure of the acts
committed.  Thus, in the case of South Africa, amnesty was
conceived as a judicial process and not as a political amnesty that
actors of the transition to democracy would grant themselves.  It was
never accepted as a general amnesty or an unconditional one
which would have created a real culture of impunity and would
bury any hope for the rule of law to emerge.  It was accepted in
exchange for truth seen there as a moral reparation.52
The SATRC received some 7000 applications for amnesty, and thousands
of Afrikaaners appeared before the Commission to testify.53  Although skeptics
may doubt the sincerity of certain amnesty seekers and many may question
whether the complete truth can ever be revealed, these testimonies served a
valuable restorative function.  By giving the perpetrators an opportunity to seek
forgiveness from their victims, it enabled those victims to purge their anger.
Because the victims possessed the ability to forgive, they held power over the
perpetrators.  In many cases, the perpetrators acknowledgment of the victims
suffering was an essential beginning to restore the victims sense of humanity.54
Some Potential Advantages of Establishing an Iraqi TRC
A carefully constructed Iraqi TRC could provide benefits to that country that
would not result from criminal prosecutions.  First, the TRC process is an
excellent way to create a collective record of atrocities so that Saddams reign
of torture and terror can never be credibly denied.  By documenting and
accepting its painful past, Iraq may reduce the risk of its repetition.55
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol58/iss1/2
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missions.  Id.  The SATRC issued its final report for South Africa, totaling more than 3000
pages, in November 1988.  Id. 
56. Truth Commission, supra note 32.  The SATRC, charged with giving as complete a
picture as possible of the causes, nature and extent of human rights violations, consisted of
seventeen members, presided over by Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu.  Castelnau,
Building Roads, supra note 45 (internal quotation omitted).  By contrast, as noted above, the
unwieldy mechanism constructed to prosecute Saddam Hussein includes seven judges, four
prosecutors, and fifty or so U.S. Department of Justice helpers.  See supra note 34 and
accompanying text.
57. Recall that 22,000 victims provided testimony to the SATRC, chronicling 38,000
serious offenses.  See supra note 51 and accompanying text.  Seven thousand perpetrators
sought amnesty.  See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
58. Neighbour, supra note 17 (noting that the budget for the tribunal established to
prosecute Saddam and his high-level accomplices is $75 million for one fiscal year only).
59. See, e.g., U.S. Complicit in Husseins Atrocities, at http://www.journalstandard.com/
articles/2003/12/20/opinion/letters_to_the_editor/letter02.txt (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
Also, an Iraqi TRC might be a more thorough mechanism for providing
cleansing, restorative justice.  A properly constituted TRC should be far more
flexible than the cumbersome judicial machinery required for formal
prosecutions.56  As such, its less formal procedures conduce to processing more
offenders and victims than could possibly be accommodated through the court
system.57  Thus, the SATRC would appear far more likely to reach (and
redress) a maximum number of atrocities.
For some, the economies of scale offered by the SATRC would be attractive.
By virtue of its ability to process more offenders and victims, maximum justice
could be made available at a lower cost.  Press accounts reveal something of the
vast financial, prosecutorial, and judicial resources already committed to
bringing Saddam to trial.58
Another benefit of an Iraqi TRC would be avoiding allegations likely to
surface during Saddams trial that the United States bears some responsibility
for the atrocities committed during his reign.  Specifically, the United States is
not immune from criticism that even as Saddam was practicing genocide against
the Kurds  with the full knowledge of the U.S. government  the United
States was providing financial assistance to Iraq of between $500 million and
$1 billion annually.59
Less tangible, but from a victim-centered standpoint more valuable, TRCs 
unlike criminal tribunals  provide a unique environment, which allows for the
dissipation of hatred.  Supplying a safe, receptive forum for victims to relate
their personal sufferings is an important part of helping those who endured
unimaginable suffering and trauma to regain their sense of humanity.  The
predicates for amnesty  confrontation, complete disclosure, and a plea for
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2005
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forgiveness  empower the victims and recognize the victims moral
superiority relative to their oppressors.
More practical is the grim reality that offenders literally know where the
bodies are buried.  Amnesty provides a powerful incentive for the disclosure of
information that would not likely be made available through either plea
bargaining or criminal prosecution.  To the extent that this information provides
answers to haunting questions regarding whether, how, where, when, and why
someone was killed, for some its disclosure may signal the beginning of healing
and the end of agonizing speculation and cruel false hope.
Would a TRC be adaptable to the needs and cultural mores of Iraq?  That
question is beyond the scope of this essay (and well beyond the expertise of its
author).  But I do believe that the example set by the courageous South African
neodemocracy is worth studying  perhaps even emulating.
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